Practices of Art by Smith, Barry
Practical Knowledge: Outlines of a Theory of 
Traditions and Skills, J. C. Nyíri and B. Smith (eds.), 
London/New York/Sydney: Croom Helm, 1988
Practices of Art 
Barry Smith 
However far the work of art may form a world inher-
ently harmonious and complete, still, as an actual single 
object, it exists not for itself, but / or us, for a public 
which sees and enjoys it. [so that] every work of art is 
a dialogue with everyone who confronts it. . . . At 
certain epochs [however] the public may be corrupted by 
a highly praised 'culture', that is by having put into 
its head the perverse opinions and follies of critics and 
connoisseurs (Hegel, Aesthetics, pp. 264f., 1184). 
1. Action and Ontology 1 
Works of art, as we shall here conceive them, are the 
products of deliberate or intentional activity on the part 
of human beings manifesting certain kinds of competence 
or skill. Certainly there are aesthetically pleasing objects 
existing independently of human creative activity. But an 
object - an arrangement of shells or leaves, let us say -
which came into existence by accident and which did not 
serve as the basis for any shaping or forming activity by 
any human being would not be a work of art, however 
many superficial similarities it might bear to other objects 
commonly accepted as such. 
This chapter is a study. of the essential interwovenness 
of objects and actions in the world of art, an investigation 
of the conditions which objects must satisfy if they are 
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to be works of art and which actions must satisfy if they 
are to yield artistic objects. It is an essentialistic in-
vestigation, in the sense that it attempts to describe the 
essences or structures of the various entities - things and 
states, processes and events, acts and actions - configured 
together within the cultural world, starting out from the 
view that we might best understand such entities by exam-
ining first of all the most simple or typical cases. More 
abstruse or complex cases may then be understood by re-
flecting on the various possible deformations or extrapol-
ations of the cases already considered. 
In a number of respects our investigations will parallel 
much of what goes on in the writings of Hegel and Marx 
and the ideas set out below in fact evolved out of a com-
parison between certain aspects of the Marxist and pheno-
menological approaches to social and cultural formations. 2 
Both Marxists and phenomenologists are concerned to 
understand the structures of the social world in terms of 
the interconnections between different segments of reality; 
that is, they are concerned with the objects themselves in 
contrast, for example, to analytic philosophers, who are 
concerned in the first place with the analysis of certain 
kinds of language. Phenomenology and Marxism differ. of 
course, in their views as to the nature of the privileged 
entities in terms of which descriptions should be formulated. 
Thus phenomenologists tend to assume that the structures 
of individual human consciousness manifest a peculiar 
intelligibility, and that the structures of social and 
cultural reality should be accounted for, as far as 
possible, in terms of the relations they bear to the 
individual subject. (Phenomenology has thus inspired the 
'micro-sociology' of Alfred Schiltz and his successors.) 
Marxists, on the other hand, believe that the historically 
existing structures of what they call 'social action' are 
uniquely intelligible. 3 Hence the Marxists' descriptions of 
individual consciousness are themselves presented within a 
framework which assumes that social action is somehow 
basic, so that Marxist social theory amounts always to one 
or other form of collectivism. 
Within the specific field of aesthetic phenomena, Marx-
ism has often been associated with an action-theoretic 
approach, an approach which sees the essence of such 
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phenomena as lying not in special sorts of objects but in 
the specific nature of the things artists and audiences do 
in certain sorts of context. This approach, which is not 
exclusive to the tradition of Marxian aesthetics, 4 is 
commonly held to be at odds with an essentialistic ap-
proach of the sort defended here. Essentialism is seen as 
dictating a too narrow methodology, restricted to the 
description of what is static and substantial, where the 
concern with action and with artistic practice (or •praxis') 
is seen as making possible a broader, more dynamic treat-
ment of the matters in hand. The essentialist is not how-
ever restricted in his ontology to static categories like 
those of substance or thing. He can argue that actions, 
too, and even those much more complex and diaphanous 
entities which are the competences and practices on which 
they rest, are no less capable of treatment in essentialistic 
and ontological terms than are the products to which they 
give rise. Indeed a certain symmetry between actions on 
the one hand and objects on the other will make itself felt 
throughout the present essay. 
Art works are dependent, now, not only upon the ac-
tions of their creators, but also upon certain correlated 
activities of an appropriately receptive audience. A shell, 
or a leaf, or a relic of some lost civilisation, existing in a 
world lacking every tendency toward appreciative evalu-
ation, would be simply a shell, or a leaf, or a lump of 
stone. It would lack those intentional qualities which mark 
off works of art from other, more humdrum varieties of 
worldly furniture. 
What, precisely, is the nature of this two-fold relation 
between a work of art and its creator and audience? It 
seems, first of all, that the two arms of the relation are 
importantly different. The work of art depends upon the 
artist only for its coming into existence. Once created it 
achieves a certain self-sufficiency, which allows it to 
float free and enjoy a life of its own, to which the artist 
may make no noticeable contribution. The first arm, 
which is thus in place only transiently, we shall refer to 
as the relation of ontological source, 5 and we shall say 
that an object a has its ontological source in a second 
object b wherever a is such that, in virtue of its essence 
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or material structure, it could not have begun to exist 
unless b also existed. 
The second arm of the relation, in contrast, is more 
properly a matter of dependence in the sense that, as we 
shall see, the work of art is such as to owe its continuing 
to exist to the activities of the audience. We shall say, 
accordingly, that an object a is dependent upon a second 
object b wherever a is such that, in virtue of its essence 
or material structure, it cannot continue to exist unless b 
exists. 
We need to go further however: for both source and 
dependence as here defined would embrace also cases 
reflecting certain merely ephemeral properties of the 
things involved, cases we want here to have excluded. 
Consider, for example, the relation between a husband 
and his wife. Certainly the husband is such that, as a 
matter of necessity, he cannot continue to exist as such 
unless his wife exists. This is however purely a reflection 
of certain analytic relations among the relevant concepts. 
In the present context we shall require the defined 
relations to reflect intrinsic properties of the things 
themselves. Accordingly we shall insist that a shall be 
dependent on or have its source in b only in those cases 
where a is sensitive in its material structure to changes 
in the material structure of b. (In the sense, for example, 
in which an act of visual perception is sensitive to cer-
tain changes in the objects perceived.) The work of art 
is thus not merely dependent on the artist in the analytic 
sense that it owes its status as a work of art to the fact 
that it had an origin of this general sort. Rather, the 
detailed material constitution of the work reflects precise 
and specific actions of the artist. Similarly, the work is 
not dependent upon an audience for its continuing to exist 
in the merely analytic sense that, should all audiences 
cease to exist, then it, too, would go out of existence as 
a work of art (reverting to the status of a mere lump of 
stone). The work will much rather manifest a sensitivity 
in the qualities which it comes to possess as a work of 
art to even subtle changes in the constitution or in the 
habits of its audience. s 
The relation of dependence so defined may be either 
one-sided, where a is dependent upon b but not conversely; 
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or reciprocal, where objects are dependent upon each other. :i 
Wherever an object a is dependent upon some other object 
b, al1 objects which share the material structure of a -
that is all objects of the same kind or essence as a - will 
manifest a dependence upon some object similar in kind to 
b. This insight has been used in recent years as the basis 
for a series of fruitful empirical hypotheses in a number 
of areas, above alJ in linguistics 8 and in various branches 
of psychology. 9 The kinds exhibited by the objects which 
constitute the subject-matters of these disciplines are for 
example phoneme, word, sentence, colour, tone, interval, 
emotion, all of which are in a certain sense natural or 
inteJligible. What is most important however is that this 
intelligibility is manifested not only by what might be 
called the standard or prototypical instances of these 
kinds, but also by their various non-standard instances. A 
mottled white, an out of tune middle C, a nonsense word 
like 'slithy', an objectless fear, and so on, are each such 
as to involve an intelligible departure from the standard 
or prototypical instances of the kinds in question. 1 0 The 
fact that even the non-standard instances of intelligible 
kinds are themselves intelligible makes it possible to estab-
lish more than merely tentative, empirical Jaws as to the 
range of deviations which they may exhibit (as nonsense 
words are governed by quite precise laws e.g. as to pronun-
ciation and spelling). Indeed, recent advances in psychology 
are beginning to suggest that the opposition between stand-
ard and non-standard instances of intelligible kinds may 
have a central and hitherto unsuspected role to play in 
our empirical understanding of the nature of human cogni-
tion. 1 1 
2. The Structures of Human Work 
Here we are concerned specifically with the standard and 
non-standard instances of action-kinds and object-kinds 
manifested within the world of art. A useful starting point 
for our inquiries is provided by the description of the 
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phenomenon of human work that is to be found in Book I 
of Marx's Kapital. Here Marx distinguishes six distinct 
kinds of 'moment' or 'element' involved in human work, 1 2 
which he designates as follows: 
(i) the worker, 
(ii) the materials upon which he works, 
(iii) the instruments with which he works, 
(iv) his actions as a worker, 
(v) the goal toward which he works, 
and 
(vi) the product of his work (the new form which is 
acquired by (ii)). 
Each of these elements is, as a matter of necessity, 
indispensable, Marx now goes on to argue, if work is to 
exist at all. The indispensability of (i) follows from the 
fact that work is, of its nature, a deliberate or inten-
tional process. Work exists only where the processes of 
inanimate nature are to a greater or lesser extent steered 
or directed by an individual human being. 1 3 
(ii) is indispensable in virtue of the fact that purely 
mental activity, though it may constitute an essential 
preparatory phase of certain types of human work, func-
tions as a part of the working process only to the extent 
that it issues forth in some determinate alteration in the 
world of material nature. 1 4 
From this we can infer that (iii) - which Marx de-
fines as •any thing or complex of things which the worker 
interposes between himself and the object of his work, 
and which serves as the director of his activity upon that 
object' - is also indispensable. 1 5 Taken in a wider sense, 
the instruments of work include 'all objectual conditions 
that are required for the process of work to take place', 
including the earth itself, with its gradually evolving 
network of streets and roads, canals and railway lines, 
and all other means of communication, including human 
language. 1 6 The level of development of these external 
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conditions provides one measure of the development of man 
himself. 
The indispensability of (iv) follows similarly, though 
only if we recognise, with Marx, that the worker may for 
example employ his own hands as the instrument of the 
working process - and become himself transformed there-
by. 
The absence of (v) reduces work to mere activity, that 
is: to the level of mere interaction with inanimate nature: 
work is, in Marx's terms, not an isolated action, but an 
enduring complex of exertion and will, directed towards 
the realisation of some given end. 1 ✓ 
Finally (vi) - the new form that is acquired by (ii) -
is also indispensable. 1 8 For a process of work must issue 
forth in some product, even though this product need not 
match precisely the idea in the mind of the worker on 
initiation of the working process. Marx himself identifies 
the end-product of work as a material thing, 'a stuff of 
nature which, by having its form changed has been appro-
priated to h1,1man needs', in virtue of the fact that 'work 
has bound itself to its object'. 1 9 We might therefore con-
ceive Marx's 'end-product' as something like the sum of 
materials and newly acquired form. 
It is clear, therefore, that these six elements do not 
exist merely side by side; rather, they interpenetrate or 
intervolve each other in such a way that each is sensit-
ive, in its material structure, to changes (to 'transforma-
tions' in the Marxist jargon) in the remaining elements. It 
is only in the context of that total structure which is the 
working process that there can exist, for example, instances 
of the kinds working instrument, or goal or product of work. 
This allows us to make sense of Marx's claim - which 
derives from Hegel - that the worker himself is changed 
'in his essence' by his actions as a worker. 2 0 Work is, 
from the Marxist perspective, anthropogenic. The worker 
is shaped by his actions (and thereby also by the materials 
with which he works) into a new object, only partially 
coincident with the old. It is important to see how central 
are these ideas to Marx's entire dialectical conception of 
human development. The latter rests essentially on the 
idea that man is capable of being subjected to a whole 
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series of essential or qualitative transformations, as the 
caterpillar is transformed into a butterfly. 21 
The actions of the worker are dependent, too, upon 
the instruments used, upon the material worked and upon 
the specific goal of the given working process. Actions 
directed towards distinct goals are distinct actions, even 
though, from the point of view of an external observer, 
they may be physically indistinguishable. For action is 
not merely physical behaviour: it depends necessarily 
upon a background of beliefs and intentions, as also upon 
a wider surrounding context. Finally the goal of the 
working process - as a complex of beliefs and intentions 
on the part of a given individual subject - is itself of 
such a kind that it cannot exist unless that individual 
subject also exists. 
We may summarise the results of our discussion in the 
form of a diagram (a snapshot of the relations obtaining 
between these given elements), somewhat as follows: 
(v) 
goal 
I 
(i) 
worker 
r 
(iii) 
instru-
ments 
I (iv) 
actions of 
the worker 
(ii) 
material 
worked 
(vi) 
end-product 
(new form of 
ii 
Figure 1: The Basic Structure of Human Work 
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The solid frames surrounding (ii) and (iii) signify that we 
have to do here with independent objects (objects which 
do not depend on other things in order to exist). Broken 
frames signify dependent objects, and the single and 
double links connecting such frames to the walls of neigh-
bouring frames signify dependence relations. which are 
respectively one-sided or reciprocal. The double-headed 
arrow connecting (iv) to (vi) represents the relation of 
ontological source. 
It is possible to read off from a diagram of this kind 
propositions expressing the relations of source and de-
pendence which bind together the objects pictured. Thus 
for example the end-product of the working process owes 
the source of its existence to the actions of the worker. 
Such propositions may express, first of all, the relations 
actually obtaining between the different elements of some 
given process of work. But since what is true of any ac-
tually existing goal or end-product is no less true of all 
objects which share the same material structure, it is pos-
sible to read off from the diagram also general proposi-
tions concerning corresponding essences or kinds. The 
truth of such propositions - which are for example of 
the form: •any instance of kind A depends upon (or has its 
source in) some instance of the kind B' - is then not con-
ditional upon the existence of particular instances of the 
kinds in question. 
But the diagram allows us to account further for the 
distinctions between standard and non-standard instances 
of the corresponding kinds: any object recognisable as a 
potential element in the total structure is, as it exists 
outside this total structure, a non-standard instance of 
the relevant kind. Thus a redundant machine, or a piece 
of flint which has not yet been extracted from the earth, 
are examples of non-standard instances of the kind 
working instrument; unrealisable goals, or goals which 
issue in no efforts towards realisation, are non-standard 
instances of the kind, working goal, and so on. 
These remarks make clear that Figure 1 is in a certain 
sense incomplete. Thus it takes only negligible account of 
the time-structure of human work (it ignores the fact that 
the instruments of work may themselves undergo changes 
- be used up - as a result of the process of work). And 
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most of all it ignores those further elements with which 
work is inextricably associated, above all the elements of 
consumption. As Marx puts it in the Grundrisse: 
The product receives its last finishing touches in con-
sumption. A railroad on which no one rides, which is 
consequently not used up, not consumed, is only a 
potential railroad and not a real one. Without production, 
no consumption; but, on the other hand, without 
consumption, no production; since production would then 
be without a purpose ... the product first becomes a 
real product in consumption~ e.g. a garment becomes a 
real garment only through the act of being worn; a 
dwelling which is not inhabited is really no dwelling; 
consequently, a product, as distinguished from a mere 
natural object ... first becomes a product in con-
sumption. Consumption gives the product the finishing 
touch by annihilating it, since the result of production 
is a product, not as the material embodiment of activity 
but only as an object for the active subject. 2 2 
Some of the mentioned simplifications will be rectified in 
the course of what follows. The account summarised in 
Figure J will however serve as a provisional basis for our 
investigations of the place and structure of human work 
in the specific field of art. 
3. Practice and Competence 
Work is, in all its dimensions, capable of cumulation. As 
Marx recognised, not only the instruments and the mater-
ials involved in any given process of work but also the 
worker himself are typically the end-products of previous 
work. A worker has normally served as material of pro-
cesses of training, through which he has become trans-
formed by the work of others. 2 3 What is interesting is that 
we can conceive this process of working on others as a 
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special case of human work in general, as conceived 
within the terms of the theory sketched above. 
Note, first of all, that all articulate human activity and 
indeed human maturity in general is dependent upon 
processes of training of the given kind. These processes 
may on the one hand be individual in that they are dir-
ected toward one single person who is their subject. On 
the other hand however they must in every case be also 
in a certain sense social. Certainly it is possible for an 
individual to train himself for some specific end, by using 
his own body as the material of work - it is this we have 
in mind when we talk of someone working himself into a 
given culture, discipline or institution. Yet even such self-
training must involve others, if not directly, then at least 
indirectly. For training consists in the attempt - which 
may be more or less successful - to instill in the indi-
vidual who is its subject a competence which he himself 
does not possess. An entirely private process of training, 
one which did not draw, for example, on manuals or 
textbooks which had been produced by others, would 
therefore presuppose that the competence to be instilled 
was somehow already in the possession of the individual in 
whom it was to be instilled, and this reduces the idea of 
such a process to absurdity. 
The process of self-training is social also in the sense 
that its goal will involve - in normal circumstances - the 
intention on the part of the individual in question to insert 
himself into some actually existing system of shared rules 
or practices - to put himself into a position where the 
correctness or incorrectness of his actions will be capable 
of being established by others. A private activity which 
lacked this second moment would not be a process of 
training in the proper sense, however many superficial 
similarities it might bear to, for example, processes of 
learning by rote. Faced with an individual who persisted 
in such an activity, who insisted that he was training 
himself, but whose actions were incapable of being under-
stood in terms of any system of publicly shareable rules, 
we should find it impossible to classify these actions in 
normal terms at all, but would be tempted, rather, to talk 
in terms of madness. As Marx writes: 
182 
I 
Practices of Art 
Man is in the most literal sense of the word a zoon 
politikon, not only a social animal, but an animal which 
can develop into an individual only in society. Produc-
tion by isolated individuals outside society - something 
which might happen as an exception to a civilized man 
who by accident got into the wilderness and already 
potentially possessed within himself the forces of 
society - is as great an absurdity as the idea of the 
development of language without individuals living 
together and talking to one another. 2 4 
A process of training is successful if it gives rise in the 
individual who is its subject to a competence which is, at 
least in part, identical in its structure to already existing 
competences on the part of other members of society. 
Qualitatively similar competences which are possessed by 
distinct individuals within a society and which are such as 
to share common historical origins are competences in a 
single practice (for example a language or a system of 
table-manners). There are of course cases where there is 
a division of labour in the maintenance of a given practice, 
so that different groups of individuals manifest qualitatively 
different though complementary competences for example 
in virtue of their different levels of authority. In any 
case however it can be affirmed that, while a given com-
petence is in every case the competence of some specific 
individual (the competences possessed by distinct individuals 
may be at most similar but never identical), one and the 
same practice is capable of being shared by an arbitrarily 
large number of individuals. Practices are, in this sense, 
intrinsically social objects. A given practice depends for 
its existence upon a group of individuals whose interactions 
maintain in being the relevant competences. It exists only 
to the extent that there are individuals in society who 
share similar competences and maintain these competences 
in mutual interaction, for example by responding in appro-
priate ways when the practice is seen to have been flouted. 
Thus the same processes of training and of critical inter-
action which typically give rise to linguistic and social 
competence in the individual provide a foundation for the 
existence of the associated practices in society as a whole. 
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Here the two moments of goal and instrument of work 
have, for the sake of simplicity, been ignored. The core 
of this diagram - items (i), (ii), (iv) and (vi) - is in other 
respects identical to the diagram above of human work in 
general. It contains, however, the two additional elements 
of practice and established competences, elements which 
form the indispensable background of the processes of 
training here considered. These processes are in the first 
place mediately dependent upon the practices which they 
sustain. But there are dependence relations also in the 
converse direction (from (viii) to (iv) via (i) and via (vii) 
and (i)). For just as, in Marx's original discussion, the 
individual worker is shaped, in his nature, by his actions 
as a worker, so also here: individuals are shaped by their 
activities in training and criticising others. The practice 
itself is therefore mediately dependent upon the associated 
processes of training, and hence it will exhibit a sensitiv-
ity in its structure to changes in these processes (as the 
grammatical structure of the English language has in part 
evolved as a result of changes in the standards and 
methods of training people in its use). 
In addition to the relation of generic dependence there 
is a second novel feature of the source-dependence dia-
gram above. The end-product of the process of training, 
a newly established competence on the part of some 
specific individual, differs from the end-product of the 
more mundane processes of work considered above in that 
it is not an object that is able, once created, to exist 
independently of the process which created it. The new 
competence is itself dependent for its continued existence 
upon elements of the process to which it owes the source 
of this existence. We shall find in what follows that the 
presence of both these features is characteristic of all 
structures exhibited in the world of art. It is the (generic 
or non-generic) dependence of cultural phenomena on 
associated mental acts to which reference is made when 
such phenomena are referred to as 'purely intentional 
objects•. 2 6 
186 
Practices of Art 
4. Art Work 
Practice and competence are, I now wish to argue, essen-
tial moments of the process of artistic creation. There are, 
certainly, isolated instances of works of art that have 
been produced by accident, or by work on the part of an 
individual isolated from the public institutions of art and 
from all training in technique. Such objects may even 
serve as inspiratory forces in the subsequent development 
of artistic forms; but then the given objects are, until 
they are taken up by others and inserted into the social 
world of artistic practices, non-standard instances of the 
kind work of art. They become works of art in the strict 
sense and acquire their capacity to exert an influence 
upon other artists only where an appropriate background 
of competence and practice begins to be provided for 
them. 
The true test of the thesis here def ended is provided by 
instances of radically creative art which generate entirely 
new forms. How can a theory which conceives a back-
ground of established competence and practice as an indis-
pensable presupposition of artistic creation acknowledge the 
existence of entirely original artistic forms? This question 
will be confronted in the sections that follow. Here we 
shall consider only those products of human work which 
are, from the standpoint of their genesis, standard 
instances of the kind work of art (instances of what we 
might call •normal art'): novels, paintings, works of sym-
phonic music, consciously and deliberately produced to a 
more or less determinate pattern by an individual working 
against a background of accepted rules and techniques. 2 7 
The individual in question is someone who has acquired a 
competence in the practices of his chosen medium. In the 
case of the novelist, for example, these practices are most 
conspicuously of a linguistic nature. But they may consist 
also in attitudes relating to the sustained exertion of will 
and technique (the attitudes of the craftsman). More 
generally, we can say that the artist's total competence is 
acquired, at least in part, through processes of training 
involving others: it rests first of all upon association with 
teachers, critics and audiences, but then also upon asso-
187 
Practices of Art 
It follows from all this, however, that not every prac-
tice imaginable in principle can in fact become established 
in a human culture. Practices are capable of becoming 
established only if they are consistent with the biological 
and psychological make-up of human beings, and only if they 
satisfy those higher level essential laws which flow from 
the structures of work, inculcation, and correction. A 
newly initiated practice imposed by authority which did 
not meet these conditions must gradually mutate into some 
more complex but also less artificial practice, in ways 
which are perhaps not capable of being recognised by its 
instigators. 
The interconnections, now, between (a) individual 
competences (both those already existing and those being 
acquired), (b) social practices, and (c) processes of train-
ing, are relations of source and dependence which reflect 
the connections between corresponding moments of human 
work as set forth above. 
Practices and established competences are reciprocally 
dependent on each other. A competence in a given prac-
tice cannot, of course, exist, unless the practice itself 
also exists. And a practice can exist only to the extent 
that relevant competences are established amongst, and 
are manifested in the interactions of, individuals in 
society. Note, however, that there is an important differ-
ence between the two arms of this reciprocal dependence 
relation. A practice does not depend for its existence 
upon the existence of any specific individual competence 
(and therefore, a fortiori, it does not depend upon those 
individual competences which are in process of being 
instilled at any given time). A practice depends, rather, 
only upon competences and their bearers taken in general. 
(Practices are therefore not affected by the fact that 
individuals manifest the corresponding competences to 
differing degrees.) This generic dependence of practice on 
competence, a type of dependence relation not so far con-
sidered, may be elucidated, crudely, as follows. 2 5 We shall 
say that an object a is generically dependent upon a popu-
lation b of objects (which may be changing, by increments, 
over time), whenever a cannot exist unless successive sub-
groups bi of b also exist, a being sensitive, in its material 
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structure, to changes in the material structures of the 
members of the successive b1. 
We may express these interconnections in a suitably 
amended version of Figure I above, employing an inverted 
single arrow ('---<') to symbolise the relation of generic 
dependence: 
(vii) 
estab-
lished 
compet-1 
enlces _j 
- --, 
(viii) 
practice I 
r-
1 
(ii) 
material 
worked (some 
specific 
individual) 
(i) 1 I (iv) 
general l__j processes of...,~~ 
public r-7 training 
I I 
t I 
Figure 2: The Production of Competence 
185 
(vi) 
new 
com-
petence 
~-
Practices of Art 
ciation with other artists and with the products of their 
work. 
What applies to the creator of genetically standard 
instances of works of art, to the artist working within a 
framework of established practices, applies also to the 
members of his audience. The capacity of the reader to 
appreciate a novel as a work of art, no less than the 
capacities of the writer, depends upon the acceptance of 
shared practices of an appropriate sort. A manifested 
competence in the given practices is a necessary presup-
position of someone's counting as a member of the liter-
ary audience. These practices, and the associated compet-
ences, are sustained by a never-ending process of self-
training on the part of the audience as a whole, by a 
process of work, whose instruments are existing works of 
literature and whose materials are the individual members 
of the audience themselves. 2 8 
Because the receptive practices of the audience will, of 
necessity, reflect the structures of actually existing works 
of art, and because the creative practices of the artist 
will be sensitive, at least in part, to the practices shared 
in common by the members of his audience, it will follow 
that these two sets of practices are reciprocally dependent 
on each other. Each is to some degree sensitive in its 
internal structure to changes in the structure of the 
other. Both sets of practices are, in their turn, generically 
dependent upon the totality of individuals in whose beha-
viour and competences they are manifested. These indi-
viduals constitute what we shall call the general public 
(for some given art, within some given culture or society). 
The audience within this public is that ever-changing 
group of individuals who have acquired, to differing 
degrees. the relevant receptive competences, and who 
manifest these competences in their appreciative association 
with specific works of art. But the general public com-
prehends also artists: individuals who have acquired 
relevant creative competences and who manifest these 
competences with varying degrees of success in the 
production of works of art. 2 9 
What, then, is the structure of the process of artistic 
creation for genetically standard works of art? Here 
again. it is useful to return to our original description 
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of the structure of work in general. We can distinguish, 
as before, six interconnected elements: 
(i) the individual artist, 
(ii) the material upon which he works, 3 0 
(iii) the instruments of his work, 
(iv) his creative actions as an artist, 
(v) the goal of these actions, 
(vi) their end-product (the new form that is 
acquired by (i)). 
These elements are connected by relations of source and 
dependence precisely as in Figure I above. Where we are 
dealing with genetically standard instances of works of 
art, we must recognise also at least the following addi-
tional elements: 
(vii) the specific individual competence of the artist 
(which has its source in prior processes of training) -
it is upon these competences that both the specific goal 
of the given process of work and also the creative 
actions of the artist will depend. 
This competence will in turn reflect: 
(viii) practices which the artist shares in common with 
his fellow artists. 
We are assuming that the end-product of a given pro-
cess of artistic production is in fact a work of art. 3 1 But 
of course it is not within the power of the artist himself 
to determine that the product of his activities shall be 
anything more than. say, a lump of stone. That this end-
product should be art would seem to depend upon certain 
qualities of the relevant audience. Imagine, for example, a 
piece of chiselled stone, produced for private (devotional) 
purposes by an individual living in isolation from other 
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essentially social phenomena. connected by relations of 
generic dependence. The work of art itself can be seen 
to straddle the boundary between what is individual and 
what is social. On the one hand it may be a specific indi-
vidual thing (for example a lump of stone). On the other 
hand, however, in virtue of its dependence (as a work of 
art) upon appropriate audience practices (upon a tendency 
existing in society toward appropriate kinds of receptive 
appreciation), it must also be an intrinsically social phe-
nomena, and in the case of music and literature this in-
trinsically social nature is clearly manifested in the fact 
that here the work itself is an abstractum which can be 
identified with no specific individual object. 
5. The Problem of Creativity 
In offering a description of the creative process which 
places so central an emphasis upon training, competence 
and practice, we may be accused of having propounded 
an exaggeratedly conservative theory of art. This emphasis 
upon the essential role of practice (of tradition, observance, 
respect) seems, however, to be unavoidable where we are 
dealing with what we have called genetically standard 
instances of works of art, with works of art produced 
according to accepted patterns by artists who take for 
granted established standards and techniques. But what 
account is to be given of exceptional works of art, of 
those products of truly creative activity which overturn 
existing standards and, by instituting new patterns and 
techniques, serve as the motor of artistic development? 
There are, as we have already had occasion to mention, 
isolated instances of works or forms of art which have 
been brought into existence in part by accident. Innova-
tions generated by accident raise no difficulties for the 
conservative theory: here society itself constitutes the 
filtering mechanism which determines the sorts of acci-
dental innovation which will be allowed to survive and to 
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exert an influence upon subsequent developments in prac-
tice and technique. 
What, however, of those cases where it is impossible 
to assert that an innovation is merely the result of acci-
dent? The history of art bears witness to the existence of 
individuals who seem to manifest a power or capacity to 
initiate new forms or styles, and to carry their audiences 
and fellow artists with them to such a degree that, 
through their influence, a succession of novel practices 
comes to be established. Here, surely, it is the individual, 
and not society as a whole, who serves as filter through 
which innovation flows. 
The problem of providing an account of what might 
be called radical creativity must be faced by every theory 
which would wish to draw attention to the essentially 
social nature of the phenomena of art. It is particularly 
pressing for conservative or traditionalistic theories of the 
type sketched above, for the insistence upon the deter-
mining role of practices, i.e. of entities inextricably social 
in nature, may seem in the end to be capable of being 
supported without reservation only in relation to works 
of art which are such as to exhibit no trace of originality 
whatsoever. Theories of this kind, it could then be ar-
gued, would have ignored precisely what is essential to 
the artistic process. 
How, then, are we to give an account of artistic innov-
ation or originality, of the capacity of exceptional indi-
viduals to initiate new artistic forms or techniques or to 
produce works of art which are exceptional in some rele-
vant respect? It would be straining credibility to assert 
that such individuals are extraordinary only in the sense 
that they had served as the point of convergence for a 
whole series of innovatory accidents. It would, on the 
other hand, be to seek refuge in irrationality to talk 
instead of the given individuals as manifesting peculiar, 
not further explicable qualities of •genius' or 'inspiration'. 
This would be to abandon the project of a theory of 
creativity. 
Such considerations have given rise to the attempt to 
construct psychological theories of the artistic process, 
to conceptions of the creative artist as an individual who 
has a capacity to think out for himself new standards and 
193 
Practices of Art 
rules, to instill in himself novel competences and to mani-
fest these competences in his creation of works of art, 
independently of any background of established practices. 
Such conceptions lead, when taken to extremes, to the 
denial of any social conception of art. For if the individual 
artist is conceived as having the capacity to think out new 
artistic forms for himself. then it would begin to appear 
as though the present or fuh,1re acceptance of his creative 
efforts on the part of society as a whole were nothing 
more than a dispensable trimming to his activities. To 
grant to the artist this independent power of creation 
would seem to imply that innovatory works of art may 
still exist, as works of art, even in the face of total 
apathy, or antipathy, on the part of all actual or possible 
audiences. This would imply a complete inversion of the 
dependence relations between the individual and social 
moments of the process of artistic creation as set forth 
above. The social moments are no longer the governors of 
the artistic process, but are reduced to the status of mere 
epiphenomena. 
It may be thought that since the two sorts of doctrine 
were developed initially to deal with two different sets of 
case, there must be room in a total theory for elements 
of both. Psychologistic (individualistic) intuitions could 
be brought into play to deal with those artistic processes 
which seem to manifest a breaking free from established 
practices, where the individual artist is apparently striding 
forward in advance of his audience; conservative (social) 
intuitions to deal with processes which are essentially 
reproductive of existing styles, where the artist is work-
ing in such a way as to accommodate himself to the tastes 
and competences of his audience. 
For all its superficial attractiveness. however, there 
are serious difficulties with an eclectic theory of this 
kind. For how are we to account within its terms for the 
mechanisms which establish, for any given instance of 
extraordinary or innovatory activity on the part of some 
professing artist, that the products of this activity are 
innovatory art, and not, in the terms of our discussion 
above, mere lumps of stone (or mere manifestations of 
aggression or pique)? Some innovations do indeed prove 
to be of such a nature that they are able to call forth 
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corresponding practices from society as a whole. But this 
is just to say that they do, at some stage, satisfy the re-
quirements of the conservative theory. The proponents 
of extreme forms of psychologism may be prepared to 
issue a blanket acknowledgment of all products of innovatory 
activity as works of art, simply because they appear novel 
or strange, and doctrines of this kind are reflected in 
many currently popular conceptions of the artist as essen-
tially a rebel or baiter of society. Against these 'perverse 
opinions and follies'. however, the proponent of the con-
servative doctrine must once more have the last word: for 
only some products of innovatory activity will - at some 
point in the future - manifest a capacity to call forth 
associated practices in society as a whole, will become, 
that is to say, accepted in the practice of society as works 
of art (and the condition that an object be accepted in 
the practice of society is, of course, considerably stronger 
than the condition that it be, say, hung in a gallery). 
The proponent of extreme psychologism is prepared to 
reject any distinction between true and false innovation, 
and therefore he is prepared also to erase the distinction 
between the truly creative artist and the rebel or deviant. 
One might, however, be tempted to suppose that a less 
extreme eclectic theory can be developed, a theory which 
would rescue the distinction between truly artistic crea-
tion and spurious innovation by offering a substantive 
account of this distinction, for example by providing a 
specification in psychological terms of the different kinds 
of attitudes or processes of thought which are the accom-
paniments of creative activity. But is it really possible to 
distinguish true from false innovation by reference to a 
distinction among kinds of mental states or processes? 
The desire merely to provoke may after all, in isolated 
instances, give rise to truly creative art, and there is no 
guarantee that the intention to produce creative art will 
lead to anything more than the production of lumps of 
stone. 
More careful reflection suggests, in fact, that to seek a 
criterion of innovation in any objectively determinable 
feature of the processes of thought of individual artists 
must be a fruitless enterprise. These processes are acces-
sible, at best, through autobiographical reports whose 
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reliability is incapable of being independently established. 
And even the evidence that is provided by such reports 
suggests that what goes on in the artist's mind during the 
process of creation is at most connected only loosely to his 
productive actions. But how could this be otherwise? For 
if these actions are to lead to the production of works of 
art which are, in the strict sense, innovatory, then it 
seems difficult to imagine how their creation could have 
been the result of any articulate process of thinking out 
beforehand. For such thinking must itself, by the argu-
ments advanced above, depend upon a background of 
already existing practices, 3 4 and thus the products to 
which it may give rise cannot be innovatory, but at best 
the realisation of forms and structures that are already 
latent in these existing practices. Society, once again, 
asserts its authority over the claims of the individual 
artist. 
The only remaining alternative for the proponent of 
a psychologistic conception is to assert that the mental 
processes which accompany creative activity are essen-
tially inarticulate. 3 5 To adopt such a view, however, is to 
abandon the attempt to provide a substantive theory of the 
nature of innovatory activity. For its appeal to the notion 
of inarticulate thinking, like the appeals of earlier, roman-
tic philosophers to the notions of genius or inspiration, 
leads us back once more into the realm of the inexplicable. 
6, Outlines of a Theory 
Can we, then, develop a more adequate version of the 
conservative theory, which - while acknowledging the 
central determining role of practice and tradition in the 
world of art - is nevertheless able to recognise some 
creative power in the exceptional individual? Is it pos-
sible, that is to say, to develop a substantive theory of 
individual creativity which does not appeal to spurious 
powers of reason, or to a spurious freedom, of the indi-
vidual artist? 
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A still provisional starting point for such a theory may 
be formulated as follows: the creative individual is not 
someone who has an extraordinary capacity somehow to 
think out new forms or practices for himself; he is, 
rather, someone who is able to immerse himself in an 
existing practice - or be immersed by his master - to an 
extraordinary degree. An account of this kind brings us 
back once more to our comparison of the artist with the 
crafts man. It stresses the importance of those kinds of 
rigorous processes of training which endow the creative 
artist with a total competence in his medium, and presents 
a view of radical creativity as the achievement of an 
individual who manifests an exceptional tractability in 
relation to a given practice, to the extent that he is able 
to move within it with perfect (thoughtless) ease and so 
tease out its hitherto unforeseen possibilities. 3 6 All human 
beings are, it would seem, born with a tractability of this 
kind in relation to the rudimentary practices of ordinary 
language, but some infants would seem to ma?if est the 
same tractability also in relation to the practices of, say, 
music or chess or mathematics. 
This provisional theory offers an account only of that 
kind of artistic creativity which consists in drawing out 
the possibilities of an already existing practice (in bring-
ing to consummation a form or style already established 
in the work of others}. Products of creative activity of 
this kind are not, of course, truly novel at all. The truly 
creative artist is normally conceived not as an individual 
who brings to perfection the work of others; he is, 
rather someone who himself initiates forms and practices 
. . 
hitherto unrecognised. Thus he works ahead of, and not m 
the wake of, the relevant public. We should not, however, 
be misled into exaggerating the differences between these 
two kinds of creative activity. As the arguments above 
were designed to show, even the products of truly innov-
atory activity cannot be entirely alien to already existing 
practices. They must embody a latent tendency to call 
forth that work on the part of an audience which would 
give rise - at some point in the future - to corresponding 
appreciative reactions. And we can reasonably suppose 
that an audience will manifest a willingness to undergo 
the processes of self-training which would be necessary to 
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come to terms with such products only if it recognises 
something in them which would justify such expenditure 
of effort. An object which was, in all aesthetically 
relevant respects. entirely alien to existing audiences, 
could embody no tendency to call forth appreciative 
reactions, and it would be inexplicable how an object of 
this kind could become accepted as a work of art. 
Truly creative activity - where it is not a matter of 
accident - must therefore reflect existing practices. How, 
then, is it possible that it should bear the mark of innov-
ation? This paradox might, perhaps, be resolved along the 
following lines: the truly creative artist is, again. an 
artist who has been able to immerse himself in existing 
practices to the extent that they have become plastic in 
his hands. His creativity consists. however, not in the 
fact that he has drawn out hitherto unforeseen possibilities 
of these practices; it consists. rather, in the fact that he 
has been able to immerse himself in disparate systems of 
practices in such a way that, through his productive 
activities. practices hitherto alien have become fused 
together. 3 ' This revised account of creativity is able to 
reconcile the possibility of truly innovatory activity with 
a commitment to the dependence of all artistic processes 
upon corresponding socially established competences: an 
audience is able to bring itself to a position where it can 
appreciate innovatory works of art, because these works 
have themselves been created against a background of 
practices with at least some of which its members are 
familiar. 
The revised theory is able to do justice to the fact that 
the creative individual seems in almost every case to have 
no explicit awareness of the nature or root of his innova-
tion. One may argue, indeed, that a fusion of practices of 
the given kind, if it is to give rise to successful works of 
art embodying styles or forms which are truly novel, could 
not, in the relevant respects. be the intended result of 
any deliberate process of thinking out on the part of the 
artist in question. The necessary processes of thinking 
could exist only to the extent that the relevant fusion of 
practices had taken place already. Thus there is no higher 
level of practice-independent 'pure reason' which would 
enable practices to be compared and contrasted, their 
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fusibility to be established by means of some kind of 
rational process of calculation. 3 8 The truly creative artist 
is indeed typically someone who is so completely immersed 
in his medium that he may remain unaware of the fact 
that a process of fusion, and the initiation of a novel 
practice, has taken place at all. 
It is worth stressing, finally, that the revised theory -
in marked contrast to psychological theories of the type 
mentioned above - admits of an empirical evaluation. Thus 
it would be possible, by investigating a range of particular 
examples of artistic creativity - and perhaps also by look-
ing at similar phenomena in, for example. the sphere of 
economic innovation or scientific theorising - to establish 
the extent to which creativity, where it is not simply a 
matter of accident, does in fact reflect the fusion of 
practices in which the individual in question has been 
immersed. The consideration of, for example, the creativity 
of the late Habsburg Empire, 3 9 or of the influence of 
Japanese art upon Western painters, of the role of Italian 
forms in the music of the German baroque, or of Lessing's 
fusion of Greek and native German dramatic forms, to 
choose just a few examples at random, suggests not mere-
ly that the theory would receive some considerable degree 
of support from such inquiries, but also that the very 
process of putting the theory to the test in this way may 
throw new and interesting light on the phenomena 
investigated. 
Notes 
1. Thanks are due to Lydia Goehr, Ed Swiderski and Johan 
Wrede for valuable comments on an earlier version of this 
paper. 
2. As concerns phenomenology, the ideas presented are 
derived from the work of the Polish philosopher Roman 
Ingarden, whose investigations of the stratified structures 
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exhibited by works of art have in recent years become 
increasingly familiar to writers on aesthetics. I have paid 
particular attention also however to lngarden's purely 
philosophical writings. especially to his The Controversy 
over the Existence of the World (1964/5). a treatise on 
ontology in very much the same essentialistic vein as is 
adopted in the present paper. As concerns Marxism - a 
term here employed in the loosest possible sense - my 
account has been influenced not only by a very limited 
reading of Marx himself, but also by lngarden•s Marxist 
critics in Poland and by the works of the Italian Marxist 
philosopher Ferruccio Rossi-Landi. 
3. On the role of this assumption in the thinking of the 
later Wittgenstein, see Rossi-Landi 198 I, sec. 3f. 
4. See e.g. Wrede 1980. 
5. This terminology is derived from the first volume of 
Ingarden 1964/5, vol. I, sec. 13. 
6. A human being. similarly, is sensitive in his internal 
constitution to variations in environmental conditions 
relating to climate, diet, and so on. See Ingarden 1964/5, 
vol. I, sec. I 5, vol. II/2, pp. 53f. and sec. 62. 
7. Similarly they may be either single-rayed, where an 
object is dependent for its existence on precisely one 
other object, or multi-rayed, where an object is simul-
taneously dependent upon a manifold or plurality of other 
objects. These and related distinctions are discussed in 
detail by Husserl in his third Logical Investigation. Cf. 
also the papers by Mulligan, Simons, Smith and aggregates 
thereof, in the list of references below. 
8. One thinks here particularly of Jakobson, Bdhler and 
the Prague School: see e.g. Holenstein 1975, 1975a and 
1979, though similar ideas have been propounded also 
more recently by proponents of linguistic and cognitive 
universals. Note that talk of essences or kinds and of 
essential or material structures can be granted varying 
degrees of ontological credence. Thus it need not be un-
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derstood as involving any commitment to entities existing 
in some Platonic realm in addition to the specific indi-
vidual objects which are their instances; it may for 
example be taken as a shorthand device for talk about the 
similarities or affinities which obtain between objects 
taken purely as individuals. 
9. See the survey in Holenstein 1986. 
10. This holds also in relation to many of the structures 
studied in other human sciences, such as economics or 
jurisprudence: see Smith 1986a and the references there 
given. 
11. Cf. above all the works of E. Rosch and her associates. 
For the use of the opposition between standard and non-
standard instances in linguistics see e.g. Hudson 1984 
(discussions of the "selective inheritance principle"). The 
basic idea goes back at least as far as Aristotle. For some 
discussion of related ideas in more recent philosophy see 
Wolterstorff's account of properties 'normative and non-
normative within a kind' (1980), and lngarden's discussions 
of •borderline cases' (1931, ch. 12 and 1976). 
12. Marx 1975, pp. 193ff. Cf. also Rossi-Landi 1975, 2.3.2 
et passim. A moment is, in the terminology introduced 
above, a dependent part. The use of the terminology of 
Momente and of the theory of dependence relations which 
join M omente together in different kinds of wholes is one 
further point of contact between Hegel and Marx on the 
one hand and the early phenomenological tradition on the 
other. 
13. Marx 1975, p. 192. 
14. Ibid., p. 195. 
15. Ibid., pp. I 94f. 
16. The conception of human language as an instrument of 
certain kinds of human work is defended in Rossi-Landi 
1975. 
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17. Marx 1975, pp. 194f. 
18. Again, it must be borne in mind that we are at this 
stage dealing always with standard instances of the kinds 
in question. 
19. Marx 1975, p. 195. 
20. Ibid., p. 192. 
21. See Sowell, p. 14 et passim, for a useful discussion of 
this aspect of Marx's thought. 
22. 1971, p. 24. Compare also Marx 1975, p. 198. 
23. Cf. Marx 1975, pp. 196f.; Rossi-Landi 1975, especially 
2.3.2. 
24. 1971, p. 18. 
25. Generic dependence is in some respects a generalisa-
tion of the multi-rayed dependence introduced in note 7 
above. A related notion of generic dependence is discussed 
in Simons 1982. 
26. See e.g. the discussion of derived and non-derived 
purely intentional objects in lngarden 1931, esp. pp. 126f. 
of trans. 
27. Because Ingarden, in his aesthetic writings, concen-
trates almost always on such genetically standard works of 
art, it has often been supposed that his theory is unable 
to account satisfactorily for innovatory forms (see e.g. 
Lissa 1975). This is, however, to misunderstand the more 
general philosophical background to Ingarden's views. His 
concentration on standard cases derives simply from the 
fact that the non-standard case can be understood only 
against the background of a prior understanding of the 
standard cases. Thus it is in relation to the latter that 
the ontological peculiarities of works of art, and of in-
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tentional objects in general, must first of all be estab-
lished. 
28. The instruments of this process will include also, 
for example, works of criticism and of literary history, 
courses of lectures on literary theory, and so on. Ingar-
den's extensive writings on literary concretisation and 
on the 'life' of the literary work (see e.g. 1931, ch. 13) 
consist, in effect, in a discussion of these systems of 
mutual interdependence between literary work and liter-
ary audience. 
29. For the sake of simplicity we shall ignore further 
aspects of the complex institutional structure and sub-
di visions of this general public. Thus we shall ignqre, for 
example, the special roles of critics, teachers, publishers, 
gallery owners and so on. 
30. It is not always clear what this material is: consider, 
for example, the case of literature. (Rossi-Landi would 
have argued that it is here language itself that is the ma-
terial worked.) 
31. More precisely: that the new form which comes to be 
possessed by the materials of this process is the form of 
something which can properly count as a work of art. 
32. It should be noted that we are not committing our-
selves to the stronger claim, characteristic of the subject-
ivist current in much recent philosophy of art, that a 
work of art exists only to the extent that it is the object 
of specific appreciative reactions on the part of some 
individual member of the relevant audience. lngarden sees 
the literary work as a complex but unified structure, 
dependent for its existence upon but not reducible to 
certain tendencies towards appreciative reaction on the 
part of its readership (1931, sections 18 and 64ff.). The 
subjectivist, on the other hand, sees the work itself as 
being reborn in each successive reading. Thus he rejects 
the very idea of a literary work as a common pole of the 
responses of its readers. There exist, he argues, only the 
various readings which each successive subject creates for 
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himself. It is a consequence of Ingarden•s view that a 
given reading may be more or less right or wrong, more 
or less correct or incorrect, according to the degree to 
which it succeeds in concretising structures latent in the 
work itself. One principal task of the literary theorist 
consists, on this view, in the rigorous statement of the 
criteria by which the degree of correctness of a given 
reading may be established. From the standpoint of sub-
jectivism, in contrast, each reading is as good (or as bad) 
as any other, and the search for publicly acceptable cri-
teria of correctness is misconceived. 
33. This diagram may be compared to the diagram of the 
structure of action provided by Nordenstam in his 1978, 
p. 71. Nordenstam's views on these matters seem to coin-
cide in some respects with those presented here; they are 
however formulated within the framework of the later 
Wittgensteinian philosophy, rather than in the vocabulary 
of Husserl and Ingarden; thus they dispense with all varieties 
of essentialism, talking instead of 'family resemblances'). 
34. Aesthetic concepts cannot be attributed to those who 
are known to lack the relevant skills: cf. Nordenstam 
1980, 1981. 
35. Views of this kind are nowadays popularly formulated 
in the vocabulary of psychoanalysis. 
36. The associated competence becomes, in effect, a part 
of his physiology. See Smith 1986a, Grassl and Smith 1986. 
37. I owe this account of creativity to J. C. Nyiri, whose 
formulation in turn has its roots in ideas put forward by 
Wittgenstein and by the Hungarian art historian Arnold 
Hauser. Note that the conception of creativity as a matter 
of the fusion of disparate practices is to be distinguished 
from views of creativity as consisting merely in the 
bringing together of hitherto separate elements and forms. 
See, on this, the discussion in Grassl and Smith (1986) of 
the opposition between what we there call the 'crude 
diversity theory' and the 'parallel reference system 
theory'. 
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38. Hence one cannot agree with Wrede when he suggests 
that 'The inventive or creative activity of the artist or 
author does not in any significant way differ from that of 
any problem solver, a philosopher, an engineer, or a car-
penter' (1980, p. 140). Wrede seems to defend a view of 
this sort also in section 6 of his paper in the present 
volume, though it now seems to play a less important role 
in his general conception of the creative process. Note 
that a similar running together of two quite different 
sorts of phenomena - calculation, and what one might call 
instantaneous perception - is manifested also in many 
writings on the phenomenon of entrepreneurship in 
economics. A more adequate theory of entrepreneurial 
perception has however been put forward by the econo-
mists of the Austrian school, most persuasively by Israel 
Kirzner (1979). 
39. See the arguments in Grassl and Smith 1986. 
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